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1. Introduction.
This note is the third of a series devoted to the foundations of category
theory. Our purpose is to study the underlying logic of T and T* (cf. [3]
and [4]), especially its completeness 1).
The terminology, the notations, etc. are adapted from the works cited
in the bibliography. In the metalanguage, we shall use the symbols =*
(implies) and ¢:> (equivalent).
2. The logics L 2* and L 2**.
In the formalization of 'I' and T* (cf. [4]), we have employed a two-
sorted logic with identity (equality), which will be denoted by L 2** ,
laying aside the non-constructive rule II3 (and the constants V!, V2, ••• ).
The corresponding two-sorted predicate calculus will be symbolized by L2*.
The notions of formula, of proof, etc. are the customary; however, we
observe that each argument-place of a predicate symbol (predicate letter)
may be filled by variables of both sorts. The first sort variables are
x, x', x", , y, y', y", , Z, ZI, z", , and the variables of second sort are
t, t', t", , U, u ', u", , V, v', v", The primitive logical symbols arc v
(or), ----, (not) and V (for all); we define the abbreviations ~ (implies),
& (and), ==:; (equivalent) and [if (there exists) as it is usual.
Postulates of L 2* :
A, Band 0 are formulas.
AvA~A AvB~BvA
A~B
B
If <X is a variable, A(a) is a formula and 0 is a formula which does not
contain <X free, then:
1) This work was partially supported by a research grant of the Fundaeao de
Amparo a Posquisa do Estado de Sao Paulo (FAPESP), Brazil. The author wishs
to thank Professors Hans Freudenthal and Leon Henkin for useful comments on
the original version of this note.
1 Indagationes
2A(lX) is a formula, fJ is a variable free for lX in A(lX) and if lX is of second
sort, fJ must be of second sort:
II2 VlXA(lX):) A(fJ)
Postulates of L 2** :
The postulates of L 2** are I 1- lI2 above and the following:
III1 Vx(x=x)
A(lX) is a formula and fJ and yare distinct variables free for lX in A(lX) :
IlI2 fJ=y:) (A(fJ) =A(y)).
If the schema lI2 is formulated in the usual form, that is, if it is required
that lX and fJ must be variables of the same sort, then L 2** becomes the
usual two-sorted predicate calculus with equality, L;, and L 2* becomes
the customary two-sorted predicate calculus, L 2 •
Theorem 1. If r F in L 2*, then F is valid in all sets of two non-
empty domains 81 and 82, 82 C 81, such that 81 and 82 are the ranges
of the variables of first and second sorts.
Theorem 2. ~* is complete: every formula F , valid in all sets of
two non-empty domains, 81 and 82, under the conditions of the preceding
theorem, is provable in ~*.
Proof. Any of the standard completeness proofs for the two-sorted
predicate calculus, L 2 , may be adapted to demonstrate the completeness
of ~*.
Lemma 1. In L 2** (x and t are variables of first and second sorts) :
r Vt[f[x(x=t).
Theorem 3. If r F in L 2** , then F is valid in all sets of two non-
empty domains 81 and 8 2, 8 2 C 81 (81 and 82 are respectively the ranges
of the variables of first and second sorts; = is interpreted as the relation
of equality).
Theorem 4. L 2** is complete: every formula valid in all sets of two
non-empty domains 8 1 and 8 2, under the conditions of theorem 3, is
provable in L 2**.
As usual, in the calculi L2* and L2**, r 1= F means that F is a semantic
consequence of (the formulas) r.
Theorem 5. Let rr F be a deduction of L2* (or ~**) without
variation of variables. Then, we have in L 2* (or in L2**): rl= F ~ rr F.
It hardly needs saying that the Herbrand-Schmidt theorem, for instance
in the form of SMILEY [9], p. 67, can be conveniently reformulated to
cover ~* and ~**. Clearly, it is possible to generalize the foregoing
considerations in several ways (for example, imposing other restrictions
3on 8 1 and 8 z or taking into account more than two sorts of variables).
Let L n and L:, 1 <;;; n <;;; w, be respectively the n-sorted predicate calculus
and the n-sorted predicate calculus with equality. If we generalize the
notion of P-k-transform of a formula of L I and adapt the exposition
of [1], we may prove, for instance, the following results (the proofs are
finitary in the sense of KLEENE [8]):
Theorem 6. F is a formula which does not contain the symbol =.
Then, f- Fin L z* (or L n ) if and only if f- Fin L z** (or L:, 1<;;;n<;;;w).
Theorem 7. For every quantifier free formula of L z* (or L n , 1<;;;n<;;;w),
there is a proof in which only quantifier-free formulas occur.
Theorem 8. If the formula F does not contain the symbol =, f- F
in the n-sorted intuitionistic (minimal) predicate calculus if, and only if,
f- F in the n-sorted intuitionistic (minimal) predicate calculus with equali-
ty. This is also true for the implicative and positive calculi.
It is plain that results similar to the preceding ones can be established
for the one-sorted predicate calculus with restricted variables (cf. [5] and
[6]). Generally speaking, the true results for L n (or L:), 1 <;;;n<;;;w, with
a few modifications, are also valid for L I (or L;) with restricted variables
and conversely. In particular, it is possible to formalize T and T* using
as underlying logic a strengthened form of L; and the cited species of
variables.
There is no difficulty to introduce the operation of restriction of variables
in L z*, L z**, L n and L:, 1<;;;n<;;;w, and this operation has the expected
properties.
3. «-conipieieness.
To simplify, we assume that: 1) IX and fJ are ordinal numbers of Von
Neumann; 2) if IX;>W, then O<fJ<;;;lX; 3) if IX<W, then o<B«; w.
Let Co< be the classical predicate calculus with the family (Ct)tEtx of
(distinct) constants. The postulates of Co< are, for instance, II-lIz of [4],
conveniently adapted to take into account the constants Ct, i E IX, and
the fact that there is only one sort of variables. We shall denote by Co<*
the calculus Co< to which we have added the following rule Z):
(IX) A(co),A(CI),A(cz), ...
V xA (x) ,
where A(x) is a formula and A(co), A(CI), A(cz), ... are obtained from A(x)
by substituting co, CI, Cz, ... for x.
The (distinct) predicate symbols of Co<* are R j , j E fJ, and a formula
2) A rule of this type was first considered by Carnap [Ein Giiltigkeitskriterium
fur die Satze der klassischen Mathematik, Monatshefte fur Math. und Physik, 42,
163-190 (1935)].
4of this calculus with no free variables is called a statement. In the sequel,
E and E will denote respectively a set of statements and a statement.
Definition I. Let r be a set of formulas of 0/. A formula F is
said to be associated with r, if F is an immediate consequence of formulas
of r by rule (iX).
Definition II. A formula F is a (syntactic) iX-consequence of a set
of formulas r, and we write r h F, if and only if, there exists a finite
sequence of formulas, Dr, D2, ••• , Dn , where Dn is F, such that, for each i,
1<i<n, we have: a) D, is an axiom of 0",*, or b) D, is an immediate
consequence of preceding formulas by one of the rules of 0",* (except (iX)),
or c) D l is a formula associated with r or with a set of iX-consequences
of r. The sequence Dr, D2, ••• , Dn is called an iX-deduction of F from
(the hypotheses) r. If r=0, the iX-deduction is an iX-proof and F is said
to be an iX-theorem.
Remark. Suitable forms of the usual metatheorems of 0", (the de-
duction theorem, the rule of proof by cases, ... ) are true for 0,,*.
Defini tion III. Let M be a set such that 0< M <iX. An iX-interpre-
tation 1M of 0",* is an interpretation of the constants and predicate
symbols of 0/ in M (cf. COHEN (2], p. 12), satisfying the condition:
to each element m E M there exists at least a constant which is its "name"
according to 1M.
Definition IV. An iX-model of a set of statements r of 0/ is an
iX-interpretation in which all statements of r are true (cf. COHEN [2],
pp. 12-13).
Definition V. In 0/, E is a semantic iX-consequence of E if every
iX-model of E is also an iX-model of {E}. In this case, we write E i~ E.
E symbolizes the set of all statements associated with E (including
the elements of E itself). L is the set of all syntactic iX-consequences of E.
Lemma 2. In 0,,*, if E is consistent, then E has an iX-model.
Proof. For instance, by a (non trivial) modification of the proof of
Godel's generalized theorem, also called Godel-Malcev-Henkin theorem,
contained in COHEN [2], pp. 13-16.
L e m m a 3. In 0/, if E is consistent, then E is consistent.
Proof. If E is consistent, E has an iX-model M. But all statements
associated with L: are also true in M. Therefore, E has an iX-model and
is consistent.
Lemma 4. In 0,,*: E is consistent ==l- L is consistent.
We have, evidently, the following theorem:
Theorem 9.
Theorem 10.
5
EI",E =-Ei-"E.
E'-- E =- E-- E.
IIX 1<%
Proof. If we have not that E!", E, the set E U {IE} would be. con-
sistent and would have an IX-model. Then, we should not have E l~ E
and this is absurd.
Supposing IX finite, that is, supposing that IX is a natural number greater
than 0, we have the following proposition (IX = nEW and IX 'I 0):
Theorem 11. E L-nE if, and only if, E In E or, in other words, if
we can deduce E from E in On*, using the rule:
( ) A(eo) &A(Cl) & ... &A(Cn-l)n VxA(x) 3).
Theorem 12. E!"E<o>EI-;iE.
Theorem 13. If IX:;;' W, E is a thesis of 0" if and only if E is an
,x-theorem.
The above results are true for .f"" the so called predicate calculus with
equality and the family (CthE'" of constants. We denote by f" * the calculus
obtained from fIX by adjoining rule (IX).
The preceding considerations show that C",* and f",* are iX-complete:
i-,i E =- :-" E. In general, if E is a semantic ,x-consequence of E, then E
is also a syntactic ,x-consequence of E.
4. The logics 2 and 2=.
2(2=) will denote the predicate calculus (the predicate calculus with
equality) of T and T*. (The postulates of 2 and 2= are respectively
I1-II3 and I1-III2 of [4].)
It is a consequence of the foregoing exposition that 2 and 2= are
complete:
Theorem 14. In 2 or 2~: E f- E if, and only if, E I~ E. (The
meanings of f- and I ~ are clear.)
Corollary 1. In 2 or 2=: i~ E <o>f- E.
Corollary 2. If F is a formula which does not contain the symbol
of equality, then f- F in 2= if, and only if, f- F in ftJ 4).
3) This well-known theorem forms part of the proof that the problem of validity
(or satisfiability) in domains with n (0 < nEw) elements is decidable, via the
method of elimination of quantifiers.
4) Evidently, our results on ex-completeness are related to certain ideas of Prof.
HENKIN [A generalization of the concept of w-eonsistency, The Jonrnal of Syrnb,
65. Generalized formulas.
The systems T and T* are easy to handle, especially if we introduce
the notion of a generalized formula. We shall treat this notion only in Cot * ;
for the many-sorted predicate calculus (with or without equality), 2
and 2-, the concept of generalized formula may be extended and has
the espected properties.
We call the symbols Ci , Cj , Ck , Cn, Cjl, Ckl, Ci2, Cj2, Ck2, ... generalized
variables. If in a formula F of Cot· we substitute a generalized variable
for the free occurrences of a variable, according to the customary con-
ventions, the resulting expression F* is said to be a generalized formula.
The common formulas are particular instances of generalized formulas
and in these last formulas a generalized variable may occur only free.
A generalized statement is a generalized formula with no free occurrences
of usual variables.
[For example, if in the formula (E is a binary predicate symbol)
Vx(x E Y V ---. (y E z)), we substitute Ci and Cj respectively for y and z,
we obtain the generalized formula Vx(x E Ci V ---. (c, E Cj)).]
In Cot *, the meaning of
is that one has
l<i A(eo),
Similarly, the meaning of the expression
is well defined.
The rule (IX) may, for example, be formulated as follows:
with clear restrictions.
The notions of IX-deduction, IX-interpretation, IX-model, etc., may be
extended to cover the generalized formulas. Hence, if r V {F} is a set
of generalized formulas, r l<i F and r l=.i F are meaningful.
For example, the following propositions are true :
Theorem 15. In Cot·' if rv {F} is a set of generalized statements,
we have: rl<iF~rl=.iF.
Logic, 19, 183-196 (1954), and A generalization of the concept of w-completeness,
The Journal of Symb. Logic, 22, 1-14 (1957)]. In a future paper, we intend to analyse
such relations and the question to what extent our results can be extended to a
wide class of infinitary languages. (Prof. Henkin has called our attention to these
problems.)
7Theorem 16. Under the conditions of the preceding theorem, we
have in .Yrx* : rhF--rl~F.
In the case of T and T*, the constants are VI, V2, Va, ... and the
generalized variables Vm, V n, Vp, etc. (cf. [3] and [4]).
6. Corrections to [4].
1) In Definition I, instead of "If IX and (3 are terms and y is a variable
of first sort distinct of IX and (3, ", read "If IX and (3 are terms and y is a
variable of first sort distinct from the free variables of IX and (3, "; some
other definitions of that paper must suffer similar corrections.
2) Page 46, instead of "The definitions of (formal) proof, of (formal)
deduction, etc., are as in KLEENE [2].", read "The definitions of (formal)
proof, of (formal) deduction, etc., are as in KLEENE [2], conveniently
modified." .
3) In his review of [4], MR 35 # 65941 (1968), Prof. G. Asser wrote:
"Bemerkungen des Referenten: Leider finden sich in der Arbeit einige
grundlegende Fehler: (1) Die Behauptung des Autors, man konne die von
ihm benutzte Regel der unendlichen Induktion eliminieren, ist auf grund
bekannter Resultate der Metamathematik falsch. (2) In der Arbeit findet
sich die folgende "Definition": Ein Term (!) IX heisst von Typ n, n = 1, 2,
3, ... , wenn IX EO Vn (Vn ist dabei eine Konstante des Formalismus). Was
soll hierbei "IX EO Vn" bedeuten? Bedeutet es "f- IX EO Vn", was wohl eigent-
lich nur infrage kame, so ist das fur den Fall, dass IX eine Variable ist,
sicher falsch. Dann wird aber die nachfolgende Definition fur "IX ist ein
Universum" in diesen Fall sinnlos. Sinnlos werden dann aber auch
Theoreme wie "Vx[i[y (x EO y & Y ist ein Universum)", an denen dem
Autor im Hinblick auf sein Anliegen, eine exakte Grundlage fur die
Theorie der Kategorien zu schaffen, besonders gelegen ist."
We must say the following. (a) With reference to (1): We have not
employed the verb "to eliminate" in the metamathematioal precise sense
and we thought this was clear by the context. It is possible to eliminate
rule IIa of [4], but instead we must modify profoundly T and T*; for
example, axiomatizing the properties of the sequence of universes VI, V2 ,
Va, ... , and the new systems are evidently not equivalent to the former
ones. (b) With reference to (2): The definition of term of type n, n= 1,2, ...
is not rigorously formulated; notwithstanding, its meaning seems to us
evident. The "good" contextual definition (or family of definitions) is:
If IX is a term,
IX is of type n = IX EO Vn (n= 1,2,3, ... ).
(Vn is not, as Prof. Asser wrote, a constant of the formalized system,
but simply a metamathematical variable.)
7. Remark added in proof.
Our results on IX-completeness (IX :> w), and their consequenses of sec-
8tions 4 and 5 of this note, seem to be true only if we adjoin to C;* (Ie< *)
the following rule ("dual" of rule (IX)):
[f[xA(x)
A(co) or A(Cl) or ... '
or other equivalent postulate.
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